

Chapter 7

Leo Apostel and Rudolf Carnap: The Development of Logical Empiricist Ethics in Post-War Europe



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Abstract In this article I will discuss two twentieth century philosophers, Rudolf Carnap and Leo Apostel, who aimed to remove ethics from philosophy. Carnap's ideas about value judgments amount to a well-known, classical account of non-cognitivism in twentieth century meta-ethics. Although Apostel's ideas are unknown, I will show that they are a direct result of his interaction with Rudolf Carnap and develop Carnap's position in an interesting way. Uncovering Apostel's attempt to develop Carnap's views on ethics is not only interesting because it sheds new light on Carnap's position, but also because it sheds light on the politically activist reception of logical empiricist philosophy in the post-war period. Contrary to what most commentators have argued, logical empiricism did not entirely lose all of its political potential after the second World War. In Belgium, through the activity of Leo Apostel, it re-acquired some of its interbellum political agenda.

Keywords Carnap · Apostel · Scientific Ethics · Non-cognitivism · Values

7.1 Introduction

How can philosophy as a discourse help to distinguish what is right from what is wrong to pursue in life? In a time of the crisis of climate, migration and the increasing popularity of nationalist politics the urge to produce philosophical aid to the seemingly insurmountable social conflicts that beset society seems pressing. It requires audacity to resist this urge, to resign from philosophy – one of the most powerful traditional tools of rationality – the responsibility of ethical guidance. In

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this article I will discuss two twentieth century philosophers who resisted this urge, Rudolf Carnap and Leo Apostel. The former's ideas about value judgments amount to a well-known, classical account of non-cognitivism in twentieth century meta-ethics. The latter's ideas on the relation between philosophy and ethics are virtually unknown, although, as I will show below, they are a direct result of his interaction with Rudolf Carnap and arguably develop Carnap's position in an interesting way. Apostel's attempt to develop Carnap's views on ethics has until now remained hidden from sight. Uncovering the attempt is not only interesting because it sheds new light on Carnap's ethical position, but also because it sheds light on the politically activist reception of logical empiricist philosophy in the post-war period. Contrary to what most commentators have argued (Reisch 2005; Howard 2003), logical empiricism did not entirely lose all of its political potential after the second World War. It did not entirely die out in Europe to become a stale, politically neutral logic of science in the United States. In Belgium, through the activity of Leo Apostel, it re-acquired some of its interbellum political agenda.

7.2 Leo Apostel Visits Rudolf Carnap

Leo Apostel (1925–1995) is an unknown, but intriguing figure in twentieth century philosophy. He grew up in Antwerp and entered the philosophy program of the Free University of Brussels in 1945, right after the liberation of Belgium. During his philosophy education Apostel had classes with the Comtian positivist Eugène Dupréel, but he was influenced the most by a young professor at Brussels, Chaïm Perelman, who supervised Apostel's dissertation on introspection in 1949 (Apostel 1989, 13). Before the Second World War, Perelman had been the most important local contact of Carl Hempel, Paul Oppenheim and Kurt Grelling, when they were collaborating privately on logical issues in Brussels in the period between 1934–1939. Perelman invited Grelling and Oppenheim to meetings of the philosophy department in Brussels, and reviewed Oppenheim and Hempel's book, *Der Typusbegriff*, which was written during their Brussels collaboration.¹ Unsurprisingly, Perelman introduced Apostel to logical empiricist philosophy, and especially the work of Rudolf Carnap. Apostel read *Der logische Aufbau der Welt* in 1946, which he immediately thought was a masterpiece and which, according to his own account afterwards, “enflamed his passion for Carnap” (Apostel 1986/2011, 480). In his autobiography Apostel writes that in those years he conceived himself as a logical empiricist (Apostel 1989, 15). It is clear that he understood logical empiricism at the time from a continental point of view: Apostel read the *Aufbau* within the context of German neokantian philosophy, relating the work to Husserl, Dilthey and Cassirer.

¹ Grelling mentions Perelman's work on their book to Oppenheim in a letter from 2 March 1940, Carl Hempel Papers (CH), Box 44, folder 2, Archives of Scientific Philosophy (henceforth ASP), Special Collections, Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh. Quoted by permission of the University of Pittsburgh. All rights reserved.

He also interpreted logical empiricism as a total attempt to destroy traditional philosophy by erecting a new one (Apostel 1989, 15). Apostel thus understood the activist potential behind the logical empiricist program early on: one can overcome ideological conflict by abandoning traditional metaphysics and adhering to the neutral logical investigation of science. In 1949 Apostel started working as the research assistant of Perelman, while writing a PhD dissertation on the concept of causality within logical empiricist philosophy. In 1951 Apostel was granted funds from the B.A.E.F. (Belgian American Education Foundation) to follow the courses of Carnap at Chicago University during the academic year 1951–1952. Apostel visited Carnap in Chicago during the fall term of 1951, and he would later go to Yale to pursue courses with Carl Hempel (Apostel 1989, 24–27). Apostel’s contact with Carnap during this period had a great impact on him. In his autobiography he writes:

When I met Carnap, I felt he was everything I had imagined he should be: he was deep, clear, considerate, modest, giving all his attention to his students and his work, explaining with care the difficult things he was doing. (Apostel 1989, 24)

In a lecture on Carnap’s philosophy which Apostel gave in 1986, Apostel even notes that “he loves Rudolf Carnap.”²

It is difficult to make you love Carnap as much as I do, and to produce in you as much adoration for him as I have. Still, this is the hidden purpose of my lecture. (Apostel 1986/2011, 466)

According to Apostel’s notes taken during his Chicago visit and also according to his testimony in the autobiography, Apostel and Carnap discussed the notions of causality and physical necessity at length, entertaining the possibility to express necessity through modal operators (Apostel 1989, 25).³ However, in his 1986 lecture on Carnap, 35 years after the interaction, Apostel does not focus on these discussions, but talks about his interaction with Carnap concerning ethics.

When I became more acquainted with Carnap, I was allowed to visit him for an entire afternoon on my own every two weeks. Sometimes he also gathered people in the evening – some sort of parties – where we could talk more freely. I once asked Carnap “Why are your views on ethics apparently so underdeveloped? After all, in everything you do, I sense a very clear ethical and political motivation.” This was impossible to miss: Carnap was a socialist and a radical pacifist. [...] However, his ethical and political stance was never mentioned in his courses. He upheld a strict distinction between his coursework and his ethical motivation. That is the reason why I asked this question. He replied: “You should consider me as a member of a movement. All my friends that formed this movement with me, each have a part to play. The person who informed me of ethical and political problems

²The lecture was the first in a series of lectures for the alumni of the Ghent philosophy program, in which retired professors would talk about their greatest philosophical influences. Apostel worked diligently to prepare the lecture. In his archives there are multiple preparatory versions in manuscript form (Archief Leo Apostel (henceforth ALA), Universiteit Gent, folder 293). In the remainder of the paper I refer to a version of the lecture that was recently edited and published by Ronald Commers in (Commers 2011). This version is based on a transcript of an audio recording of the event. All the translations from the original Dutch are my own.

³Apostel typed down some of his conversations with Carnap on physical necessity, see ALA, folder 281.

was Otto Neurath. Ever since I felt how deeply I agreed with him in all ethical and political contexts I stopped dealing with those issues. I trusted he would do so. However, I know that I have not done enough on that subject. I have defended that ethical judgements have no cognitive meaning, but this position is underdeveloped, one could say much more. You seem to be interested in ethical issues. Would you not like to continue your PhD under my supervision focussing on ethics? Stevenson's *Ethics and Language* contains too few insights in the structure of languages, in semantics and syntax. Don't you feel like working on those issues?" (Apostel 1986/2011, 468)

Both in his autobiography and in the lecture, Apostel says that he declined Carnap's offer to continue his PhD in Chicago on ethics. However, he mentions two different reasons. In the autobiography, it is Apostel's own weak psychological disposition which is invoked to explain the refusal to continue work with Carnap.

I knew my weakness and was not sure whether I would be able to endure this stressful atmosphere. Moreover Carnap overwhelmed me. I had to admire him from afar. My relation to him in a certain sense could have become self-destructive. His presence, his greatness crushed me. (Apostel 1989, 26)

In the lecture, Apostel invokes disappointment about the fact that Carnap did not find Apostel's work on causality interesting enough and instead wanted him to work on ethics.

And now, Carnap told me that I could best collaborate in the movement by working on ethics. [...] I did not do this, because I could not withdraw myself from my fascination with causality. [...]

But, I should have done what Carnap advised me to do. He was right. (Apostel 1986/2011, 468)

It is difficult to assess from the available sources whether Carnap really offered Apostel the opportunity to continue his PhD in Chicago, and also whether Carnap actually wanted Apostel to work on ethics. There are no sources contemporary to the events which can confirm this. In a letter, dated 21 February 1952, Ina Carnap writes to Carl Hempel about Apostel, as someone "to whom Carnap regularly gave extra time" and whom "Carnap thinks is very intelligent, maybe a little on the slow side – but that may be due to the language".⁴ Carnap clearly considered Apostel an interesting student, potentially also a unique student since Apostel understood Carnap's work within its European context. Whatever offer Carnap made or did not make to Apostel, the most important fact is that Apostel understood Carnap's philosophy as part of a more general movement which aimed to change society through philosophy, and Apostel deeply desired to be part of it.⁵

In his 1986 lecture he talks at length about the logical empiricist movement as an active engagement "to bring science into society, so that the people can take destiny in their own hands" (Apostel 1986/2011, 470). To exemplify this, he discusses Neurath's ISOTYPE project, situates logical empiricism in the context of Red

⁴Ina Carnap to Carl Hempel, 21 February 1952, CH, Box 11, folder 1, ASP.

⁵Ronald Commers has already discussed Apostel's ideas on ethics within the context of interbellum philosophy, including John Dewey's pragmatism and the Vienna Circle's scientific World Conception (Commers 2010, vol. 2, Ch. 2).

Vienna, goes over the parallel developments in the Bauhaus school and defends the claim that the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments is the “socio-political expression of the option to develop a philosophy which can have a politically transformative function” (Apostel 1986/2011, 472).⁶ The discussion of the logical empiricist movement in the lecture ends in existential terms:

This [political project] was the movement. It was one enormous fight, outside and inside. [...] You probably noticed, and I cannot deny it: my deepest sympathies and friendship go out to this movement. I am it and I want to be it. That is philosophy. I do not say this in a non-committal way. (Apostel 1986/2011, 475)

Apostel deeply sympathized with Rudolf Carnap’s ethos in particular, claiming that Carnap was not in the least focused on dominating others through his philosophical discourse. Unlike most other philosophers who desired the power to claim what is right or wrong, Carnap, in Apostel’s evaluation, was set on liberating others, making them choose between a variety of equally possible frameworks. Apostel characterized this ethos with a line from Nietzsche’s poem *Der Einsame* in *The Gay Science*: “Verhasst ist mir das Folgen und das Führen – nothing better exemplifies Carnap” (Apostel 1986/2011, 483).

Whatever the actual relationship was between Carnap and Apostel, Apostel understood himself as a member of the logical empiricist movement which aimed to transform society. To Apostel this movement was not an extinct project; it was alive and he would become an exponent in its European rebirth.⁷ After his return to Belgium in the summer of 1952, Apostel finished and subsequently defended his doctoral dissertation *Law and Causes (La Loi et les Causes)*. Between 1953 and 1955 he first became a post-doctoral assistant to Perelman, and then he joined the renowned psychologist Jean Piaget in Geneva between 1955 and 1956 as a philosophical collaborator. During this post-doctoral period, Carnap encouraged Apostel to write to him:

You need not feel that you can only write to me when you are able to produce a masterpiece of scientific accomplishment. We all try to work on something, and sometimes we succeed quickly, sometimes it takes longer. [...] We shall always be glad to hear from you, how you are, how you live, what your position at the University is – in short, the human aspects of your life as well as your theoretical work! (Carnap to Apostel, 17 July 1954, Rudolf Carnap Papers (RC), box 88, folder 1, ASP)

⁶Apostel’s lecture was never translated to English, even though its interpretation of Carnap’s philosophy resonates closely with the current state-of-the-art research on Carnap. E.g. Apostel discusses the relation between the *Aufbau* and Kant, Dilthey, Husserl and even Hans Driesch (Apostel 1986/2011, 481–483).

⁷In the 1960s Apostel wrote an extensive course on Logical Empiricism for his students at Ghent University, including a history of the movement, discussing the migration to the United States. He noted that after the second World War logical empiricism had almost grown extinct in Europe. He also remarked that in its American context the movement lacked “a scientific ethics”, although certain strands of such an ethics could be found in American pragmatist thinkers like Dewey. Apostel’s course was written to revive logical empiricism and its ethical agenda for his Belgian students. See, “Course on Logical Empiricism”, p. 38, ALA, folder 176.

Their correspondence, which is kept in the Carnap papers at University of Pittsburgh, shows that Apostel kept Carnap updated about his various intellectual developments and research projects. He wrote to Carnap about an empirical survey on scientists' ideas about science which he had developed with Piaget. Apostel equally updated Carnap about his advances in formalizing necessity and lawfulness.⁸ In 1956 Carnap supported a permanent appointment of Apostel as professor in Logic at Ghent University through a letter of recommendation.⁹ Because Apostel was an atheist, his appointment at Ghent was boycotted by the Catholic professors of the Faculty of Arts & Philosophy, which resulted in several months of delay. In April 1957, however, Apostel became professor in logic at Ghent University. By then he had already established a wide-ranging network of contacts, bridging disciplines (philosophy and psychology) and regions (Europa and the United States). He had also co-founded the journal *Logique & Analyse* and published a wide-ranging set of papers.¹⁰ In European philosophy Apostel had acquired a good reputation. This can be seen from his participation in the infamous 1957 conference on analytic philosophy in Royaumont which brought together the most important philosophers from the English (including Quine, Strawson and Austin) and the French speaking world. During the conference Apostel attempted to bridge the gap between ordinary language philosophy and European structuralist, comparative semantics – taking up a typical logical empiricist point of view, that any philosophical analysis of empirical language should start from the latest scientific insights in the structure of empirical languages (Apostel 1962).

In the academic year 1958–1959, only one year after his appointment at Ghent, Apostel accepted an invitation by Henry Johnstone to lecture at Penn State University as a visiting professor (Apostel 1989, 55). At first, Apostel saw the invitation as an opportunity to continue his philosophical career in the United States: he also alerted Carnap to the possibility of meeting each other again.¹¹ However, during this year, something changed in Apostel's perception of himself. He did not work out a way to continue his career in the US, explicitly avoiding the APA meetings, and he did not find a way to visit Carnap in Los Angeles. Instead, he decided to forego an international career altogether (Apostel 1989, 61).

I realised that in the U.S.A. an academic was only an isolated specialist (in the best cases). I wanted more: I wanted to live and propagate "the philosophical life" and this required that I go back to a country where I could be more than only a writer or a pedagogue but also – as I hoped in my naive enthusiasm – an agent in the transformation of a culture. (Apostel 1989, 61-62)

In line with Apostel's own understanding of the logical empiricist ethos, he did not want to become a disciplinary "school philosopher", engaged in closed-off

⁸Apostel to Carnap, undated, probably 1956, RC, box 27, folder 1, document 1, ASP.

⁹Apostel to Carnap, 25 December 1956, RC box 27, folder 1, document 3, ASP, and Faculteitsraadverslag, 25 April 1956, Archief Faculteit LW, 6A1_09, Universiteitsarchief Gent.

¹⁰A full bibliographical list can be found at <http://www.leoapostel.ugent.be/bibliografie/index.html>

¹¹Apostel to Carnap, 20 September 1958, RC box 27, folder 1, document 2, ASP.

scholarly debates. His goal was to transform the culture in which he lived. Upon his return to Belgium in August 1959, he was immediately granted with an opportunity to act on his intentions.

On 29 May 1959, the Belgian Parliament voted positively on a major reform of the entire education system. Among many other changes, the reform now installed the official possibility for non-religious students in public secondary schools to pursue a course in “non-confessional morals”. According to the Belgian constitution every student is obliged to pursue two hours of moral training every week. Until 1959, however, students who did not want to pursue religious (mainly catholic) education had no proper alternative to religious courses. The law of 1959 was an important progress for liberal pressure groups in Belgian society to introduce non-Catholic moral training into public education. The reform, however, did not foresee any university training program for the teachers of the non-confessional course. So, in reality, this implied that the new course would be taught by non-specialized teachers – a sub-optimal situation according to many liberal pressure groups. This situation resulted in increasing political pressure on the Ministry of Education to create a new University program that aimed to train teachers in non-confessional morals. Apostel, who was an important member of the Belgian Freemasons and was acutely aware of the political situation, seized this opportunity to serve his own agenda: he aimed to secure funds to think through Carnap’s views on ethics and execute a full-fledged scientific research program that would transform traditional philosophical ethics into a scientific ethics.

7.3 Carnap’s Views on Ethics

In his autobiography Carnap reiterated a point of view on value judgments which he had held ever since the 1930s: unconditional value judgments (statements that say an action or a thing is good or valuable in itself) should not be interpreted as having any truth value. One cannot refute or confirm such statements based on empirical information about the world. However, such statements do play a positive role through upbringing, education and persuasion in motivating people to act in a certain way (Carnap 1963, 80). Carnap subscribed to a conception of life according to which valuation was the domain of one’s *Lebensgefühl*, the stance of an individual towards the driving goals in her own life, typically expressed in poetry or music and strictly separated from science as the system of theoretical knowledge (Mormann 2007, 135). In Carnap’s view, scientific knowledge could still guide one’s actions, since scientific knowledge yields the most reliable information of how to materially realize certain goals. However, scientific knowledge could not help a person to determine which goals or values to strive for (Carnap 1934/2013, 178). As a consequence, questions like “Should I aid the government in killing my Jewish fellow citizens?” cannot benefit from scientific information in any way. Ultimately, the answer to such question depends on the practical decision that an individual has to make for herself (Carnap 1934/2013, 176). Therefore, scientific philosophy, as the

logical investigation of scientific languages, can offer no guide in ethical decision making.

Carnap's position on ethical problems often provoked dismay or alarm. As Carnap reports in his autobiography, his former colleague at the University of Prague, Oskar Kraus, believed that Carnap's position on value statements was a danger to the morality of youth (Carnap 1963, p. 81). In a letter to Carl Hempel, written on 13 August 1942, Carnap laments that many people in the United States had similar problems with his position:

Often people, although they no longer have any theoretical argument against our position in this point [the strict distinction between knowledge and decision] are dissatisfied, because they do not see on what basis we can reject say the value actions [sic] of the Nazis. If I were to discuss with a Nazi, I should first try to find out whether we could find a common aim even if rather remote and general. If so, there could be a theoretical discussion concerning suitable means to that end. If not, then there is no theoretical discussion possible. What remains is simply appeal, persuasion, education, or whatever we wish to call it. This may, of course, be combined with theoretical considerations; I should try to show how the life of the whole of humanity would look in the future if the Nazis had their way (which is a scientific consideration); and then I should make an appeal to reject that future state of affairs and therefore the way proposed by the Nazis. (Carnap to Hempel, 13 August 1943, CH Box 11, folder 1, ASP)

In this letter to Hempel, Carnap shows that a non-cognitivist, like himself, can still discuss ethical issues with a Nazi, although not with the intent to prove that the Nazi's actions are wrong – this is precisely beyond the realm of proof. The discussion would consist of three parts. First, Carnap and the Nazi have to discuss which aims they share. In itself, such a discussion would be difficult: Carnap and the Nazi would have to figure out which aims they actually have – something that is not immediately apparent to any person. Carnap leaves unmentioned how one could in fact pursue this part of the discussion. But once they have this figured out, the second part of the discussion could ensue: an investigation into the best means to achieve possible common aims. Here, scientific knowledge would be of paramount importance. The third part covers the aims that the interlocutors do not share: now, they attempt to persuade each other through rhetoric. Again, scientific knowledge can be helpful in this persuasive exercise. Carnap thinks his persuasive attempt to change the Nazi's valuation could be improved by using science to show the Nazi what life would be like if he had his way – in the hope that the Nazi would come understand that he does not actually desire what he says that he desires.

In a recent paper A.W. Carus similarly defended that Carnap had an overarching conception of rationality covering both knowledge and values, where “values ultimately determine what we define as reason, but the reason thus provisionally defined informs and enlightens our values” (Carus 2017, 174). This dialectic relation between values and knowledge was never articulated by Carnap himself. As we will see below, Leo Apostel's articulation emphasizes the social processes that have to be put in place for such a dialectic to take place and become a model of reasoning on values.¹²

¹² Similarly, Carus (2017, 178) emphasized that Carnap's ideas on practical reason crucially reflect their embeddedness in political interaction.

In his autobiography, written some 10 years after the letter to Hempel, Carnap similarly emphasized that his non-cognitivist position was compatible with a ‘scientific humanism’. This entailed the idea that human beings are themselves responsible for the improvement of the conditions of their life, and that this deliberate self-improvement might best come about by acquiring scientific knowledge of the world (Carnap 1963, 82–83). Using science to improve “the internal and external situation of one’s own life” is not entailed by the non-cognitivist position: Carnap cannot prove that one should value the use of science for the improvement of life, or for the resolution of ethical disagreements. This is a valuation, and thus not a theoretical position which can be true or false, neither is it a philosophical position. It is a stance that a person can take, and that Carnap aimed to advance in all levels of society. In the Vienna Circle Manifesto, this was expressed in the following way: “We are witnessing how the spirit of the scientific world-conception penetrates in growing measure the forms of personal and public life, of education, of childrearing, of architecture, and how it helps shape economic and social life according to rational principles” (Carnap et al. 1929/1973, 317). The stance of scientific humanism implied that one would no longer follow what ideology or religion says that one should do, or be engaged in a debate on ideology or religion. Instead, a person or organization investigates what they aim for as transparently as possible, and then they use scientific knowledge to execute these aims (Uebel 2012, 141–142). In 1934 Carnap also expressed this stance using a Marxist metaphor:

We reject this narcotic (of philosophical and religious metaphysics to discuss values). However, if someone else prefers to enjoy their pleasures, then we cannot refute this theoretically. But this does not mean that we are indifferent to how people decide on this matter. (Carnap 1934/2013, 179)

Carnap’s scientific world conception was not indifferent to politics in the broadest sense. Carnap’s stance implied the promotion of a revision of how people in society came to decide on value-laden issues and how they act upon their decisions. Unfortunately, Carnap rarely investigated how this promotion could be pursued most rigorously. Moreover, Carnap had no real clue how scientific knowledge exactly could be used within this new process of decision-making. In an interview of 1963, he states the following:

begin with clearing up the differences in views about facts and only when one has reached agreement in the most important points of this sort start with the discussion of the real value questions. I believe that in this way philosophy will not help us decide the value questions themselves in one way or another, but it will help us to find a clearer basis for the discussion of these questions. (Quoted from Uebel 2012, 143)

This gives a rough sketch of the process. First, find out the differences in conditional and unconditional value judgments. Second, use factual, scientific knowledge to clear up the differences in conditional value judgment’s. Lastly, after clarification, enter a phase of persuasion. Anyone who wants to pursue Carnap’s stance, has two challenges. On the one hand, one has to flesh out a model of how decision making in society comes about without the use of ideology or religion and clarify in which way scientific knowledge and logical clarification can be used in this model. On the

other hand, one has to find out how to promote the use of science in societal and personal decision-making, and demote the use of ideology or religion. As long as these two challenges are not met, the stance of scientific humanism remains mere hand waving.

7.4 Apostel's Science of Morals

Apostel took up both challenges in 1959 after his definitive return to Ghent University. He aspired to create a scientific program that could bridge scientific work at the university, political decision-making at the ministries and ethical education in secondary school. In Apostel's vision, the new program would become a motor to revise how people and organizations in society made their decisions, removing the use of ideology and religious discourse from that process. He called his proposed program *science of morals* [moraalwetenschap].¹³ At the faculty meeting of 7 March 1960 the problem concerning the training of teachers for the non-confessional morals course in secondary education came up. Apostel seized this opportunity to introduce his own program *science of morals* to resolve the teachers-issue.¹⁴ Although Apostel during the initial meeting never mentioned his true intentions behind the program, all of his colleagues welcomed the initiative. Apostel's plan was subsequently handled by an internal commission, where the debate focused on the autonomy of the program. The report of the committee states that some colleagues initially questioned Apostel's ambition to start an entirely new section with its own scientific research unit.¹⁵ Instead, they suggested that the new program could be a sub-specialization in the already available philosophy program. This would imply that the program had no research autonomy – a suggestion that was dangerous to Apostel's wish to create a new program with its own research unit. Apostel did not want the *science of morals* to become part of a philosophy program. On the one hand, he believed, just like Carnap, that ethical judgments are not the subject matter of philosophy proper. On the other hand, he wanted researchers and students in the program to perform empirical research (cf. *Infra*) – the philosophy department would not be the right place to execute that plan. In its final report the committee argues in favor of Apostel's autonomous program:

The curriculum in Philosophy is both too broad and too narrow. Of course, philosophy students are offered ethics, but also a substantial number of more general courses, which are, no doubt, of interest, but at the same time too specialised to serve the preparation to this

¹³Although "moraalwetenschap" is traditionally translated as "moral science", I find the use of the adjective in that translation deceptive, seemingly distinguishing it from immoral or amoral science. Since the program is meant to train students to scientifically study moral behavior, and use this study to overcome ethical disagreements, I find "science of morals" more suitable as a translation.

¹⁴Faculteitsraadverslag, 7 March 1960, Archief Faculteit LW, 6A1_013, Universiteitsarchief Gent.

¹⁵Verslag van de speciale Commissie Moraalwetenschap, bijlage, Faculteitsraadverslag, 8 November 1961, Archief Faculteit LW, 6A1_015, Universiteitsarchief Gent.

special kind of education [in non-confessional morals]. Moreover, the philosophy curriculum is too narrow. A number of courses in psychology, biology and sociology, which are essential to the moral scientist are lacking. (my translation; *ibid.*)

The committee noted that the teachers in non-confessional morals “should encourage confidence in the young adolescents through the teacher’s human understanding” and that the teacher should help the adolescent develop a value-scale for life. These skills might imply a training in psychology, but do not warrant the inclusion of biology and sociology *per se*, and certainly not the development of research skills in these fields through seminars, as the committee strongly advised in its report. The inclusion of a doctoral degree into the plans is equally strange within the limited motivation to set-up a program for teachers in secondary schools. Apostel, who was the head of the commission, wanted to create something else than a university program for teachers, but strategically hid most of his ideas about the program until after the rector and minister had agreed to proceed with his sketches. By October 1963, Apostel’s strategy was successful: the new, autonomous program *Science of Morals* had been established and during the celebratory inauguration Apostel finally presented his vision on the scientific and social function of the program, which most likely surprised the rector, the dean and other fellow colleagues who had helped Apostel to set it up. His inaugural speech which explicitly addressed the new students, was published as *Pluralist Foundations of the Science of Morals* [Pluralistische Grondslagen van de Moraalwetenschap].¹⁶

In the introduction Apostel articulated how most of his colleagues thought about the program: on the one hand it served as a new “practical organ” which had arisen from the need for trained teachers of non-confessional morals, and on the other hand the program was made up of a mere “encyclopaedic collection of facts” concerning the psychology of adolescents which teachers would use in their educational practice (Apostel 1965b, 69–70). Apostel intended to present to “the general public and the future students how the science of morals had the aforementioned practical and encyclopaedic nature, but how this nature should necessarily give rise to a new kind of scientific work” (Apostel 1965b, 69). Apostel’s envisioned new science faced a crucial paradox: scientists can only describe the world as it is through their methods, not as it should be, whereas the philosophers mistakenly believe that the study of values is precisely what distinguishes their field from the sciences (Apostel 1965b, 71). Consequently, there can never be a science of values. In this traditional view, scientific knowledge and valuation stand in opposition. For Apostel, this opposition has to be dissolved.¹⁷

¹⁶All subsequent translations of this text are my own.

¹⁷One can recognize a dialectical materialist ideal in Apostel’s phrasing of the problem, but also in his proposed solution to turn the reigning hierarchy between science and values on its head. Already in his student years Apostel had read Marx. Between 1959 and 1963, the period in which he fully articulated his ideas on ethics, Apostel was in close contact with Jaap Kruithof, a Marxist inspired philosopher who started as a professor in philosophy at Ghent University in 1959. For a detailed analysis of the Marxist influences at Ghent in the 1960s and 1970s, see (Christiaens 2016). During the negotiations over the new program, Kruithof always supported Apostel, but he did not

Until now, the ethics of a group has been formed by poets, politicians and prophets; subsequently the vision of these individuals has been rationalised by the individual systems of separate philosophers. Next to the apparatus that sets the goals of the group actions, there used to be the apparatus that sets the means to the group actions: essentially, science. [...] We could call this the linear and hierarchical view on culture: the goals control the means and not the other way around (hierarchical) and the apparatus of control cannot be controlled itself (linear). [...] We should abandon this structure for a cyclic and multilateral one. (Apostel 1965b, 71)

According to Apostel, a revision of decision-making in society is at stake in the new science of morals. Along the lines of Carnap, Apostel takes for granted that philosophers have no rational resource to find out what are the right values to have or the right norms to install. At best, philosophers had previously rationalized the ideas of poets, prophets and politicians. At worst, philosophers had projected their inner, psychological conflicts as eternal structures of humanity or the universe. “Much of the classic ethical literature belongs to a dangerous, emotionally appealing, but rationally obscuring genre” (Apostel 1965b, 84). Consequently, philosophers should abandon their program to set out the rules for the actions of the group. Moreover, politicians, poets and prophets – Carnap’s narcotic of ideology and religion – should equally cease to guide group action. Apostel calls this hierarchy where ideology or religion guide group action an “unconscious method”: a collective cannot properly control itself, but relies on specific individuals to guide its course.¹⁸ The collective, as it were, is under a narcotic. Instead, science as the apparatus that traditionally only yielded the means to realize the goals, should be used to help the collective set its own goals and thus abandon the narcotic.

In the emancipation of the science of morals one can see the mutation of human culture which still announces itself only silently, but which in fact implies that humanity in group takes destiny in its own hands by choosing its own goals autonomously and change these goals after mutual impersonal deliberation, using the only form of collective thinking, which is scientific thinking. Such deliberation is the goal of the science of morals. (Apostel 1965b, 72)

Apostel never created an ethical theory as a philosopher. This is exactly what one cannot do, if you take up Carnap’s stance. What remains to do, is to take up the stance of scientific humanism and transform the culture of decision-making, and this cannot be executed on the level of ideas, but has to be implemented on the level of institutions. Changing the model of decision-making in society is a social

initiate any of the discussions. During all the meetings with the faculty members and the rector, Apostel always presented the program as his own conception. During the inauguration of the program Kruithof agreed with Apostel that “the aim of the program is to train young students in competent scientific research” (Kruithof 1965, 15). Kruithof himself was mainly interested in the social and historical opportunities the program offered for Belgian culture.

¹⁸In the essay “Theoretical Questions and Practical Decisions”, Carnap similarly discusses the unconscious use of ideological and religious theories as the wrong tools to use in social conflicts, since their theories distract and confuse people (Carnap 1934/2013, 179). Carnap believed that the logical investigation of scientific languages offered conceptual tools that no longer confused people in their deliberation over social issues (Richardson 2007, 304–305).

process, which has to be initiated through certain institutional changes. In Apostel's mind, the creation of the program had a direct two-fold institutional effect. On the one hand, it would introduce teachers in secondary schools who would train students to make decisions differently than before. Students would no longer be taught to adhere to an available value scheme, like humanism or Catholicism. Instead, they would be taught to investigate within themselves what they exactly valued, how their current values had been formed and how to discuss their differences in values among each other. This changes how education in a society disciplines citizens to discuss ethical issues (Apostel 1965b, 72). On the other hand, Apostel believed the role of the university in society could also be changed: students in the *science of morals* could bridge the gap between all kinds of social science research at the University and social organizations (e.g. unions, political parties, ministries, etc.). These new students would be the beginning of an entirely novel kind of scientific researcher, who is constantly both theoretical and practical.

In Apostel's view the changes in education practices and university research would engender a complete overhaul of decision-making in society. "The science of morals can exist, must exist, but it does not exist yet. Whomever understands the enormous cultural-historical mutation that is hidden underneath the institutionalization of the science of morals, should not be discouraged by temporary stagnation or defeat" (Apostel 1965b, 72). This institutionalization would on the one hand introduce teachers in secondary education, and on the other hand doctors at the university trained specifically for building interdisciplinary bridges.¹⁹ Once both started introducing the new way of decision making on other levels of society, the process would only accelerate and eventually install itself permanently. Carnap's first problem, how to transform the decision-making culture, had thus been solved by Apostel.

The integration of scientific knowledge into the deliberation over values was the second challenge that Carnap bequeathed Apostel, and the bulk of his inaugural lecture discusses it in great detail. As Carnap describes in his letter to Hempel, the first part of any deliberation should consist in the search for disagreement over values within a collective. The first task for the moral scientist, in Apostel's text, is to descriptively chart existing moral beliefs in society (Apostel 1965b, 73–79). Several questions pop up within the task: how to distinguish moral beliefs, and how to distinguish the various systems (of groups/classes) in which these beliefs operate? How can one empirically ascertain moral beliefs: is a questionnaire, an interview, or a historical method more suited? Lastly, how should the moral scientist distance her own moral beliefs from her subject of investigation? How can one train oneself to remain as neutral as possible? These four challenges make up the *factual basis* of the science of morals – and it shows why the students had to become acquainted with biological, sociological, psychological and historiographical methods to empirically map moral beliefs. As Carnap advised in his letter to Hempel, a focus on the conflicts and tensions in moral beliefs should be central. Apostel writes

¹⁹Apostel focused heavily on the interdisciplinary nature of his proposal. Although one might think that Otto Neurath's work might have been an inspiration on Apostel in this regard, there is no indication that he was familiar with Neurath's work, at least in the 1960s.

similarly: “conflicts [over values] give rise to the possibility to influence, and to the necessity of helping the conflicted, moreover, they point out to places where reflection can become useful to practice” (Apostel 1965b, 78).

Once conflicts in moral beliefs have been identified and empirically studied, the moral scientist can use the points of conflicts as levers for action. Apostel’s paradigm for the transformation of conflicts into levers for change, is the advertisement industry (Apostel 1965b, 83). Advertisement companies align production activities of a company with the study of the group targeted by the production, the consumers. These companies first investigate what certain consumers value in products, then show to the production companies what they need to produce to entice a maximal number of consumers, and, after production, the advertisement company uses its knowledge about the consumer valuation to advertise the product in the best possible way. After the launch of the new product, the consumer population is then reassessed and possible changes in consumer valuation are communicated to the production-level once more, and so the cycle repeats itself.

The science of morals does exactly the same thing, but it has “the total task of humanity and society as its enterprise” (Apostel 1965b, 83). If a group intends to apply an action to society, the moral scientist must be able to supply the following information: which persons in the leadership would cooperate, which persons in the group are mostly keen on action, which subgroups would be willing to collaborate, which interests might delay the action, which channels of communication are the most efficient in the group, which needs in the group could be used to pursue the action most efficiently, and which parts of the action are the easiest to implement and could help other parts (Apostel 1965b, 83). Most of this information follows from the *factual basis*. The task of the moral scientist is to implement the action in an efficient way within existing social organisations. How to proceed will not be transparent from the start. Only the execution of these ideas on initially, small scales (small communities) will yield the essential experimental information of how such implementations might work in a variety of contexts (Apostel 1965b, 83). This is exactly why the start of the program is also precarious: as long as no one starts to execute the research program, no one can ever attain the necessary experimental knowledge to achieve successful transformations in society. Apostel repeats this paradox several times throughout the text: only someone who was trained in the program, will be competent to teach the program, because this person will have executed the kind of *research and action in society* that the program intends to pursue (Apostel 1965b, 84, 124). The solution to the paradox also entailed that foreign universities had to be encouraged to implement similar programs: although the program was created in Ghent due to the practical teachers-problem, it could only succeed through international expansion and collaboration. Similar empirical research had to be conducted in other countries and concerning other social conflicts, if the empirical part of the program was to achieve useful generalizations (Apostel 1965b, 123).

The advertisement-paradigm is the crux of Apostel’s integration of science and the deliberation about values: the moral scientist maps the moral beliefs in society, locates the conflicts, clarifies possible misunderstandings of conflicts, shows where collaboration is possible on common ground and offers the most efficient social

tools to bring collaboration about – potentially creating entirely new social institutions to bring about the desired effects (Apostel 1965b, 83). Afterwards, the whole research cycle repeats itself. There is, however, one crucial distinction between the advertisement agent and the moral scientist. Whereas the former has the aim to maximize consumption, the moral scientist's aim is a harmonization of values in the targeted community. Although moral scientists, according to Apostel, would be trained to remain neutral towards the various value-conflicts in the targeted community, the aim of their activities was not. At the core, the enterprise's goal was a harmonization of conflicting groups with the aid of scientific knowledge about the conflicts between those groups. Previously, religion and ideology had attempted to structure the values of groups in society. Now, Apostel envisioned, a new kind of scientific research would take over this role. This presupposed that the researchers in the program would not intervene in the social and political conflicts with their own value scheme, but that they would only intend to harmonize the already present conflicts. This is, of course, not a politically neutral scientific enterprise, just as an advertisement-agency is not neutral towards consumption or profit-maximization.

After his presentation of the advertisement-paradigm, Apostel offered five viewpoints which would help future moral scientists to execute their work. The viewpoints were to serve as focus points for the empirical research that had to be developed in the program. The first viewpoint concerns the logical analysis of belief systems. Mapping how moral beliefs are logically connected to each other within the various belief systems in a society, can aid the moral scientist in understanding where people have actual or illusory conflicts over values. These conflicts can be present between any kind of social group in a given society, e.g. different generations, different classes, etc. Only the empirical research on groups in society would show what the actual conflicts in a society were. Apostel believed that the moral scientists had to develop modal logics which could be applied to the moral judgments that they empirically ascertained in groups of society. Four logical motives could then be used to transform the moral belief systems in society: vagueness, incompleteness, incoherence and contradiction. The moral scientist can confront the actual, moral belief systems with the formalizations – and use the divergences as levers to change the value judgments involved, e.g. by showing in an effective way to target groups that two or more different choices are contained within one vague notion which these target groups use in their judgments (Apostel 1965b, 86).²⁰

A second viewpoint covers “existential perspectives”, a term which Apostel borrowed from the research of Abraham Edel.²¹ An existential perspective on a norm investigates the kinds of entities or processes that have to exist, if the norm is to have

²⁰Throughout the text Apostel adheres to a strict non-cognitivist position, constantly emphasizing the necessity to make choices. Logical clarification, which is the only operation philosophical discourse is left with, cannot help to decide, but it can help to articulate which are the available value judgments to choose from. In this sense, Apostel shares the voluntarist idea behind logical clarification of Hans Reichenbach and Rudolf Carnap (Richardson 2006).

²¹Apostel's most important reference point is (Edel 1955). For a discussion of the relation between Apostel's and Edel's views on ethics, see Commers (2010, vol. 2, 109–172).

the capacity to guide actions. E.g. take the norm “proliferate the victory of the working class over the bourgeoisie”. If there is no working class or bourgeoisie as two identifiable groups in society, or if they are not necessarily entwined in a mutual conflict, the norms become meaningless as a guide for action. In this way, one can investigate almost any moral belief on the entities or process that it stipulates, and this in turn can be checked by scientific investigations (Apostel 1965b, 90–93). Such information can then be communicated back to target groups to help them reassess value judgments.

As a third viewpoint Apostel discusses “the explanatory method”. This encapsulates all empirical research about the causes and consequences of accepting moral systems in a society. The acceptance of certain systems engenders instability or destruction of a society. E.g. The goal to erect enormous statues on the Easter Island to honor the Gods may have caused deforestation and possibly civil war. The moral scientist has to be aware that changing the goals of certain groups can have an enormous impact on society at large, potentially destabilizing it entirely or marginalizing parts of it. Therefore, the moral scientist has to have psychological, sociological and economic knowledge on the effects that a change to the goals of groups can have. Furthermore, the moral scientist also has to be aware of how people in society come to accept their goals within a moral system – most new moral systems are only accepted because they are mostly congruent with older ones, and this can create a situation where people have certain values in an inauthentic and thus unstable way (Apostel 1965b, 98–99). If moral scientists do not investigate all of this, their action research will be severely hampered.

The fourth viewpoint investigates how ethical systems operate on human behavior (Apostel 1965b, 100–114). Here, Apostel attempts to recuperate traditional normative ethics: one can study utilitarianism, hedonism or deontology as rules that guide human beings. Depending on the kinds of rules that people use in their daily life, they will start to act differently. There will be various feedback loops: the outcome of certain actions can change the kind of system which motivates people to act in a certain way. Investigating these feedback cycles will benefit the moral scientist to understand how moral rules and practices shift over time.

As the last viewpoint Apostel discusses the functions of ethical language. Here, Apostel investigates the potential use of language analysis for the moral scientist. Since an ethical judgment is an actual instrument that people use in deliberation over moral issues, the moral scientist has to know the variety of possible functions that an ethical judgment can have in specified, discursive contexts. To that end, the moral scientist can use the various philosophical language analyses of ethical judgments in an empirical investigation of how ethical statements function in real human discourse.²² In this section, Apostel aligns emotivism with the research program of

²²One of the first students of the new program, Ronald Commers, executed this idea, investigating how the “language of ethics is a never ending process of human discourse about the good” (Commers 2009, vol. 1, 9). Commers investigated how three distinct ways to talk about the good arose within different sociohistorical contexts. For a full discussion of the historical methodology behind this materialist approach to ethical discourse, see Commers (2010).

the moral scientist: “Emotivism, a position which seemingly makes any scientific ethics impossible, can be transformed into the source of an important section in scientific ethics, if only one is prepared to study concrete emotions, judgments and their linguistic counterparts within their full context” (Apostel 1965b, 120). Exactly once one understands that ethical judgments are not true or false, but express emotions and attitudes which drive human action, one can use an investigation of ethical judgments to help influence which actions people make within a society.

These five viewpoints all concern logical and empirical information that the moral scientist can use to analyze and dissolve ethical disagreements in groups, following the paradigm of the advertisement agency. Before his students would become the “Mad Men” for a better society, Apostel believed that they had to be transformed into a new kind of human being (Apostel 1965b, 125). This personal transformation was also part of the program’s political aim, i.e. a harmonization of social conflicts. The students should be able to take up the role of a *judge* concerning their own norms. They should also have to know the technologies to implement changes into social reality, being as cunning as a *politician*. Furthermore, they have to assume a *scientific ethos*, removing themselves from their own moral consciousness, and they should also have a constant *therapeutic* urge to use the moral conflicts in others as levers for personal and social transformation (Apostel 1965b, 110–111). Combining the role of politician, psychotherapist, scientist and judge, Apostel’s ideal moral scientist had much to learn. Yet, Apostel believed that two fundamental processes would realize his ideal: the students were to undergo personal and collective psychotherapy, so that they were aware of their own moral conflicts, and the students were to be positioned as interns in organizations like the industry, the military, prison, political administrations and banks. In these various contexts, the student would personally investigate the reality of social conflicts and get intimately acquainted with them (Apostel 1965b, 125). The ambitions for the program from Apostel’s point of view were incredibly high: the students had to realize a scientific institution at the university capable of transforming the core of societal decision-making. The creation of a scientific, non-ideological revolution was the goal. Such ambition was not proportionate to Apostel’s actual, social means.

7.5 Conclusion

The scope and wealth of suggestions for research in Apostel’s text is daunting. With it, we are far removed from the preliminary sketches that Rudolf Carnap produced in his lifetime. The text fully develops the challenges that Carnap never took up. First, Apostel proposes to institutionalize new scientific programs at universities which will train teachers and researchers who can transform the way decision-making is done in society. In this way, Apostel answered a crucial problem of Carnap, how to actually initiate the transformation of society – it could not be done by simply maintaining a non-cognitivist position *as an academic philosopher*. One had to transform the non-cognitivist position into an institution that is *effective in*

society – exactly what a purely theoretical stance can never be. Second, Apostel worked out the many ways in which scientific information could be used by researchers to guide deliberation in society, mainly through the advertisement agency as paradigm and the five viewpoints on future empirical and logical research.

However, this ambitious vision also brought Apostel in conflict with his colleagues: the science of morals was to be a scientific research program, not a preparation for the moral training of secondary school students. In his lecture, Apostel heavily protested against the idea that the new program would become “propaganda of the non-confessional movement” (Apostel 1965b, 122). The program and its students should be neutral towards religious values: these are values that some persons in a society have and that sometimes engender conflict with the values of non-confessional members of society. Dislodging these conflicts cannot be done by claiming that the non-confessional values are the correct ones to have – such claim would remain within the traditional model of ethical deliberation where one side was right and the others wrong. Instead, these conflicts had to be dislodged through science-aided deliberation.

Before Apostel began his lecture during the inauguration his colleagues had presented the program in terms that clearly conflicted with Apostel’s view. The Dean of the Faculty, René Derolez, thought the program primarily aimed to train teachers, and these teachers would replace religious education with non-confessional guidance: “the first task of the teacher is to offer psychological assistance to his pupils; he should assist them in building a value-scale to account for their actions” (Derolez 1965, 8). In a similar vein, Emiel Leemans, classical philologist and also the head of the philosophy department, declared to the first generation of students that: “No one can hope that our students will reach any scientific mastery in the offered domains. They will never be able to perform any independent, scientific research. Our program is aimed at moral training, focused on fostering wisdom and responsibility” (Leemans 1965, 13). The head of the University, Jean-Jacques Bouckaert, similarly did not conceive of the program as a scientific enterprise: “The aim of the program is to give students a chance to look at moral problems from all perspectives which are compatible with academic education” (Bouckaert 1965, 5). Apostel’s colleagues all believed the program was meant to train teachers who would give moral guidance to their students from a non-religious point of view, which was exactly what the liberal pressure groups had been asking the Minister of education for. None of the University leaders were aware of Apostel’s broader goals to transform Belgian society.

Except for his closest collaborator, Jaap Kruithof, no one during the inauguration mentions Apostel’s ambition to introduce a new scientific discipline which aims to start a transformation in societal decision-making. From the various addresses held during the opening celebration, it is clear that Apostel’s strategy to hide the true vision behind the program was almost doomed to fail. If the students would not get the proper scientific training by the professors and if there would be no institutional support for the student’s internships, there would never be any actual empirical research. Between January and October 1963 Apostel had been confronted with the enormous difficulty to enthruse sociologists, biologists, and economists to

collaborate and support the necessary empirical element of his program. Most attempts were in vain. The archival folder “Foundation of a Bachelor, Master and Aggregate in the science of Morals 1961–1969” contains many letters from the dean Derolez to rector Bouckaert about the problem of assigning professors to the various courses in the new program.²³ One of the new integration courses, “General Anthropology: philosophy, psychology, history and biology”, which aimed to integrate perspectives from all these disciplines in discussing ethical conflicts in society, still had no official teacher by 1969, 6 years after the launch of the program. The students who had signed up on Apostel’s promise that they would spearhead a new kind of science, were cheated: they never received proper training in empirical research.

Since the courses of Apostel’s new program had to be supported by existing funds, the students would *de facto* pursue introductory courses offered in other faculties – nothing like the research seminars that the committee behind the program had strongly advised in its reports. By September 1965, Apostel had a nervous breakdown. After his institutional struggle to create the program between 1960–1963, he had attempted to create an interdisciplinary faculty where his new research program would be properly supported. The struggle to create this new institution is a story in itself, since Apostel, between April 1963 and July 1965 mobilized all available political forces outside and inside the university to create his imagined interdisciplinary faculty. The full story behind this attempt cannot be told here; it involves a whole set of political negotiations, including ministers, policy makers, university administration and captains of industry. In the end, Apostel failed, and after 1965 he gave up all of his ambitions to influence the course of his surrounding society. In a letter to Lucien De Coninck, a biologist who had collaborated actively on the creation of the science of morals program, Apostel writes: “I am deeply disappointed about the developments in the science of morals department; our plan utterly failed.”²⁴ His disappointment cut deep. After September 1965, ethical topics in general were removed from Apostel’s interests. Whereas he had still taught a course on scientific ethics²⁵ between 1958 and 1963 and published on ethical issues (Apostel 1961, 1963, 1965a), like euthanasia, he limited himself after 1965 to strictly logical and epistemological subjects.

In his 1986 lecture on Carnap Apostel lamented that “Carnap was right” - he should have pursued a PhD on ethics at Chicago University. More than 20 years after the foundation of the science of morals program Apostel was still convinced that the transformation of ethics from a philosophical discourse into a scientific discourse was necessary, even though his own attempt at such a transformation had stalled. Despite Apostel’s enormous disappointment, the program of the science of morals persisted. It did not function as a lever to change the way Belgian society

²³ Folder 4A2_61020, Universiteitsarchief Gent.

²⁴ Apostel to De Coninck, undated, probably 1969–1970, ALA, folder 530.

²⁵ In this course Apostel argued that ethics should be transformed from a philosophy to a science. Possibly the course served as a preparatory work to his text, *Pluralist Foundations of the Science of Morals*. “Cursus Ethica 1961–1962”, ALA, Folder 20.

solved ethical and political conflicts, and it did not engender systematic empirical research on value conflicts in Belgian society. For more than 50 years, it largely functioned as a training program for teachers in non-confessional morals, the purpose for which Apostel had gotten institutional support to create the program, but resolutely not why he had designed it. In this regard, Apostel's politically laden logical empiricist philosophy ultimately suffered the same fate as philosophy of science in the United States: it became an academic enterprise that had little to no effects on extra-academic developments. In his 1986 lecture Apostel promised in his introduction to discuss the future of logical empiricist philosophy: "I would like to clarify why I think Rudolf Carnap still lives on. I have read that logical empiricism and the Wiener Kreis are dead. To me their philosophy has yet to begin, to me their philosophy continues. I want to end with a plea to take up their tradition once more, although many believe it to be dead" (Apostel 1986/2011, p. 466). By the end of the lecture there was no time remaining to pursue this line of thought. As throughout his career, Apostel's promise to articulate the political potential of logical empiricism remained just that, an unfulfilled promise. It died with Apostel in 1995.

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